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Patrick Hamilton 
Patrick Hamilton was born 22 years ago in San Jose, 
California, but has lived all but three years of his life in Oregon. 
He graduated in the spring of 1995 from Portland State 
University with degrees in English Literature and Psychology. 
His current plans include getting into graduate school, where he 
plans to study clinical psychology and work toward a PhD. 
Burrhus Frederic Skinner was born on March 20, 1904 in 
Susquehanna, Pennsylvania. Skinner graduated from 
Hamilton College with a degree in English literature, but was 
unable to achieve his goal of becoming a writer. Instead, he 
enrolled in the graduate psychology program at Harvard in 
1928 and by 1931 had earned his doctorate. Among Skinner's 
works on behaviorism are Verbal Behavior, Science and Human 
Behavior, and About Behaviorism, as well as a number of jour-
nal articles. His works also include the utopian novel Walden 
Two and Beyond Freedom and Dignity, dealing with the possi-
bilities of cultural engineering. B. F. Skinner died on August 
18, 1990, ten days after receiving the AP1\s Lifetime 
Contribution to Psychology Award. l 
1. Biographical infromation on Skinner taken from B. R Hergenhahn, An 
Introduction to tht History of Psychology, Second Edition, Wadsworth, Inc., 
1992. 
Structuring Skinner: 
Argument, Structure, and Metaphor in 
verbal Behavior 
Scholarship uses argument, and argument uses rhetoric. The 
"rhetoric" is not mere ornament or manipulation or trickery. It is 
rhetoric in the ancient sense of persuasive discourse. In matters from 
mathematical proof to literary criticism, scholars write rhetorically. 
Only occasionally do they reflect on that fact. The most common 
occasion is the manifesto, which seeks to expose the rhetoric of an 
earlier line of scholarship, demonstrating how the tone, figures of 
speech, and other devices of style to be discarded have lied or mis-
led us. Yet even writers attacking an earlier rhetoric customarily 
pay no attention to their own. Modern scholars usually deny their 
rhetoric. Wearing masks of scientific methodology first donned in 
the seventeenth century, they have forgotten about the rhetorical 
faces underneath. Their simple repetition of official rhetoric 
against rhetoric serves mainly to dampen anxieties about how 
things really happen in the lab or library. Of late, the propaganda 
of governments and advenising agencies has devalued rhetoric still 
more. 
Since the 1950s, however, and especially in the last few years, 
rhetoric has revived. Literary critics, theorists of communication, 
and teachers of public speaking never wholly abandoned Cicero, 
Quintilian, and company. Now the rhetorically minded seem pre-
scient in their steadfastness, for the masks of methodology are wear-
ing thin. Many people grow weary of claims that experimental tech-
nique, documentary interpretation, or regression analysis can avoid 
"subjectivity." Many scholars doubt that science opposes or replaces 
an, that "ought" ought not be derived from "is," or that any method 
ensures unproblematical results. Thus scientists and humanists alike 
appear again in the classical guise of rhetors: good people skilled at 
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persuasion and the inquiry neede4 to support it. (Nelson, Megill, & 
McCloskey, 3-4) 
This quotation sums up the basic philosophy behind the 
rhetoric of inquiry. It is an effort to demonstrate how the various 
disciplines, in putting' forth their theories, interpretations and 
ideas, are engaging in a rhetorical discourse, and that the ideas 
put forth, as well as their acceptance or unacceptance, depends 
as much on the schol~s' persuasive abilities as much as upon the 
ideas being put forth. 
What the rhetoric of inquiry deals with is the rhetoric, the 
metaphors, structures, arid arguments that constantly occur 
within and between various disciplines. A field that they partic-
ularly single out is social science, including psychology: 
Rhetoric of inquiry is especially valuable for the human sciences, the 
systematic studies of human kind. Rhetoric is generally recognized 
as part of the humanities. Its renaissance started there, and it promis-
es important revisions at home. But the social sciences have less 
awareness of rhetoric than do the humanities, and would benefit 
more from increased rhetorical self-consciousness. The humanities 
already regard human acts and products as events for understanding, 
criticism, and celebration; the social sciences now regard them as 
objects for explanation, prediction, and control. The role of rhetoric 
has been played down in the humanities;but it has been downright 
ignored in the social sciences. In consequence, the social sciences 
float in warm seas of unexamined rhetoric. (Nelson, Megill, & 
McCloskey, 15-16) 
This need for rhetorical analysis and discussion within the social 
scienceS applies directly to the field of psychology. The attempt 
to make the fidd of psychology into more and more of a "sci-
ence," a move in which the physical sciences serve as a template 
of "true science," has led to a buying into of science's own 
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rhetoric, which is the rhetoric of explanation, prediction, and 
control. In his article "Turning Psychology on Itsdf: The 
Rhetoric of Psychology and the Psychology of Rhetoric," Donal 
E. Carlston pointed to this fact: 
... Scientific metaphors are useful because they can aid interpreta-
tion, recall, and generalization of complex factS. But they are also 
hazardous, because they can obscure alternative interpretations and 
encourage selective memory, usually for facts that support the 
accepted metaphor. Such a metaphor may also lead scientists to 
assume, without evidence, that certain things are true because the 
metaphor implies that they should be true. 
Psychology provides innumerable examples of metaphorical reason-
ing, from Freud's Oedipal analogy for childhood sexuality to elec-
trical models of human memory. Social psychologists equate resis-
tance to persuasion with medical inoculation, interpersonal relations 
with economic processes, human memory with laundry bins, behav-
ioral expectations with cartoon strips, impression processes with lin-
ear regression, personal space with territoriality, and attribution 
processes with analysis of variance. (Carlston, 153) 
Carlston points out how science has becomes a metaphor in that 
the practice of science is a particular way of approaching or 
structuring a subject matter. He also points out that science, far 
from being devoid of metaphor, creates metaphors of its own, 
such as those he lists from psychology. 
One psychologist in particular who demonstrates the use of 
science as a metaphor for understanding human behavior is B. F. 
Skinner. In his text Verbal Behavior, Skinner attempts to apply 
the methods of science to a process hitherto unstudied by sci-
ence: language and human verbal behavior. In doing so, Skinner 
makes science into a metaphor for structuring verbal behavior, 
and Skinner creates structures for language that are metaphori-
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cally based. At the same time, Skinner denies and restricts the 
use of metaphor to understand verbal behavior. As a result of 
this, Skinner also engages in a running argument, as he places his 
application of scientific methodology to the study of verbal 
behavior in a context where it is in opposition to all other previ-
ous efforts to explain this behavior, efforts he sees as metaphori-
cally based. This analysis of Skinner's Verbal Behavior will exam-
ine the argument and discourse that Skinner engages in 
throughout this text with these other approaches, as well as 
examine Skinner's conception of science and how he uses it as an 
approach to the study and structuring of human verbal behavior. 
In another of Skinner's works, Science and Human Behavior, 
he puts forth his own idea of what science is and what its objec-
tives are: 
Science is more than the mere description of events as they occur. It 
is an attempt to discover order, to show that certain events stand in 
lawful relations to other events. No practical technology can be 
based upon science until such relations have been discovered. But 
order is not only a possible end product; it is a working assumption 
which must be adopted at the very start. We cannot apply the meth-
ods of science to a subject matter which is assumed to move about 
capriciously. Science not only describes, it predicts. It deals not only 
with the past but with the future. Nor is prediction the last word: to 
the extent that relevant conditions can be altered, or otherwise con-
trolled, the future can be controlled. If we are to use the methods of 
science in the field of human affairs, we must assume that behavior 
is lawful and determined. We must expect to discover that what a 
man does is the result of specifiable conditions and that once these 
conditions have been discovered, we can anticipate and to some 
extent determine his actions. (6) 
This passage from Skinner gives us a clear idea of what he views 
science to be and what he believes it should accomplish. For 
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Skinner, science is a way of ordering the world. And for Skinner, 
it is the ultimate way of doing so. As he says, we assume that this 
order exists;, it is the aim of science to discover the nature of this 
order. Thus order becomes something naturally occurring in the 
world; all science must do is discover and delineate this preexist-
ing order. And once this order is indeed discovered and under-
stood, it can be used to predict and control human behavior and 
action, which for Skinner is the ultimate goal of science and its 
disciplines. 
In his work Verbal Behavior then, Skinner attempts to extend 
the methods and ideas that he discussed above to what he 
describes as a subdivision of human behavior in general. As he 
briefly states, "We must find the functional relations which gov-
ern the verbal behavior to b~ explained" (VB, 10),1 In stating 
this, Skinner rejects other traditional formulations and attempts 
to explain language, such as those put forth by classical rhetoric, 
logic, grammar, criticism, semantics, and other disciplines. As 
Skinner describes it, these previous formulations of verbal behav-
ior rely too much on ideas (or events taking place inside of a per-
son) or meanings (something "expressed or communicated by an 
utterance"). One can see the behaviorist basis of Skinner in his 
rejection of these formulations, as both ideas and meanings rely 
on something th~t cannot be seen or observed, whereas behavior 
is "out there" and can be physically perceived and described. 
What Skinrier believes one needs to understand human verbal 
behavior are "causes of behavior which have an acceptable scien-
tific status and which ... will be susceptible to measurement and 
manipulation" (VB, 10). 
1. Refetences to Skinner's Verbal Bthavior will be given parenthetically within the 
text citing the page number preceeded by VB when the tide is not mentioned in 
the sentence. 
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One can already see the stirrings of Skinner's invocation of 
science here. It is from here that Skinner goes on to describe 
what he calls his "new formulation" of verbal behavior: 
Our first responsibility is simple description: what is the topogra-
phy of this subdivision of human behavior? Once that question 
has been answered ... we may advance to the stage of explanation: 
what conditions are relevant to the occurrence of the behav-
ior ... what are the variables of which it is a function? Once these 
have been identified, we can account for the dynamic characteris-
tics of verbal behaviors within a framework appropriate to human 
behavior as a whole. (VB, 10) 
What Skinner wants to do is create a framework or structure for 
verbal behavior in such a way that this framework will allow us 
to understand and, consequently, predict and control that 
behavior. In general, one could say that Skinner views human 
verbal behavior as determined by a finite number of variables or 
conditions that, once science discovers and determines them, 
will allow us to control verbal behavior. He even wants to 
account for the "dynamic" or unpredictable aspects of verbal 
behavior by use of this framework. Skinner concludes this 
description of his new formulation by insisting "that the condi-
tions appealed to in the analysis be ... accessible and manipulable. 
The formulation is inherently practical .... It makes no appeal to 
hypothetical explanatory entities. The ultimate aim is the pre-
diction and control of verbal behavior" (VB, 12). 
Prediction, explanation, control, causation, measurement, 
manipulation, variables, conditions, etc. are all ideas and terms 
that Skinner uses. They are also all traditional adages of science 
"and scientific study. It is simple enough to see that Skinner is 
adopting a scientific paradigm in his approach to understanding 
verbal behavior. Skinner's goal, the prediction and control of 
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human behavior, is also that of science which likewise seeks to 
predict and control the variables in what its practitioners study. 
They both view their objects of study as being subject to certain 
conditions or variables that, once they have been determined 
and understood, will allow us to understand that object of study. 
In this case, for Skinner that object is human verbal behavior. 
But in insisting that his approach is a "new formulation," 
Skinner automatically sets his approach against those other 
approaches to understanding human behavior, and verbal behav-
ior specifically. The one approach that Skinner deals with 
throughout his text is that of literature, as that seems to be the 
previous approach that has the best understanding of human 
behavior. And Skinner often sets the two approaches of science 
and literature against each other in his text: 
Human behavior is an extremely difficult subject matter. The meth-
ods of science have come to be applied to it very late in the history 
of science, and the account is still far from complete. But it is the 
fidd in which literature is most competent, secure, and effective. A 
Dostoyevsky, a Jane Austen, a Stendhal, a Mdville, a Tolstoy, a 
Proust, or a Joyce seem to show a grasp of human behavior which is 
beyond the methods of science. Insofar as literature simply describes 
human behavior in narrative form, it cannot be said to show under-
standing at all. (VB, 98) 
What Ski~ner is writing about here is the difference between 
simply describing behavior versus truly understanding it and 
how it happens. For Skinner, literature stops at the level of 
description. While there is no doubt that literature has perfected 
the art of depicting and describing human behavior in a way that 
Skinner describes as beyond what science can do, this has been 
done without any true understanding or knowledge of how that 
behavior functions and happens. Literature for Skinner works 
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best as a description or as an example of human behavior (and 
Skinner uses literature for this purpose throughout Verbal 
Behavior.) .Science on the other hand goes beyond literature and 
the simple description of behavior. It instead describes and 
explains human behavior: how it functions, what conditions it 
arises out of, its patterns, and so on. In effect, for Skinner, sci-
ence enables us to truly understand human behavior. Literature 
therefore appears to have knowledge of human behavior, but for 
Skinner that knowledge is of the appearance of human behavior. 
Literature has no understanding of what Skinner sees as the 
process of behavior, which for him is what enables one to truly 
understand behavior. 
Skinner goes on to describe literature, especially its use of 
metaphor, as "prescientific." Specifically, Skinner writes that "lit_ 
erature is prescientific in the sense that it talks about things or 
events before science steps in ... and is less inclined to talk about 
them afterward" (VB, 98). Skinner sees literature's use of 
metaphor as lying at the core of literature's prescientific nature, 
and delineates both literature's use of metaphor and how science 
treats metaphor differently. According to Skinner, literature 
... is rich in metaphor ... those far-fetched generic or metaphorical 
extensions which are semi-intellectual in their effect but which 
would not be tolerated within the stricter canons of science. In sci-
entific writing only a modest metaphorical extension is permitted .... 
The distinction is in how far the metaphor had been 'fetched,' the 
scientific verbal community having learned ... that far-fetched 
metaphors are sddom productive of other useful verbal behavior or 
effective action. (VB, 396) 
This discussion becomes interesting in that Skinner does not 
completely eliminate the use of metaphor from the practice of 
science. Instead, he describes a difference in the extent to which 
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literature and science use metaphor. As he writes, "Literature in 
general ... creates [its] own vocabularies by connecting verbal 
forms with descriptions of particular events or occasions from 
which they may then be metaphorically extended" (VB, 99). The 
example that Skinner uses to demonstrate this process is from 
the myth of Hercules. In that case, the particular heroic actions 
or efforts of the specific mythological being known as Hercules 
become ·a metaphor for great or heroic efforts, leading to the 
term "Herculean effort." Skinner speaks of this as the general 
process of metaphor. And it is only after this process that a term, 
h "H I Ir" h "·cal" h· h suc as ercu ean errort, can ave any practl use, W lC 
for Skinner means in the practice of science: 
When the literary expression is reinforced in its own right, it 
becomes useful in straight description. This takes the metaphorical 
force out ... and gives us no clue as to what is happening when the 
term is used metaphorically. It leads, however, to a more and more 
complex and effective nonmetaphorical terminology descriptive of 
human personality. The scientific effectiveness of such a vocabulary 
will derive from the actual contingencies of reinforcement in the sci-
entific community, not from its metaphorical origins. Any survival 
of the latter would interfere with scientific use. (VB, 99) 
As Skinner describes it, a metaphorical term such as "Herculean 
effort" that literature creates carries much more with it than a 
simple description of an event. It carries reference to its origins 
in the labors of Hercules from which it was extended. It is only 
when a term moves beyond its metaphoric origins that it 
becomes useful in scientific description. In effect, the term must 
be divorced from its metaphorical origins and its ties of reference 
to that origin for it to be used "scientifically." In literature, a 
metaphorical term is useful because it conjures up certain images 
and ideas through its use of reference. In science, Skinner feels 
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that these images and ideas get in the way and it is the descrip-
tive effect that makes the term useful. He describes this differ-
ence in the use of metaphor as 
... one of the great differences between science and literature. 
Scientific verbal behavior is set up and maintained because of certain 
practical consequences .... In literature there are no similar practical 
consequences and metaphorical extensions therefore prevail. No one 
will deny that they are effective; but the advantage we gain by read-
ing a Dostoyevsky or Joyce, in coming to share their 'knowledge' or 
'understanding' of human nature, is very different from the advan-
tage gained from scientific study. (VB, 99) 
Skinner makes this point again later as he states that 
Generic extensions are tolerated in scientific practice, but metaphor-
ical, metonymical, and solecistic extensions are usually extinguished 
or punished. Metaphorical extensions may occur, but either the con-
trolling property is quickly emphasized by additional contingencies 
which convert the response into an abstraction or the metaphor is 
robbed of its metaphorical nature through the advent of additional 
stimulus control. (VB, 419) 
In setting up this opposition between scientific and literary dis-
course, Skinner has begun an argument that runs throughout 
the length of his text. Where science according to Skinner deals 
with facts and is objective, the necessity and practicality of sci-
ence in the face of these pre-existing methods must be argued for 
before it is accepted. In approaching the study of human behav-
ior, Skinner has encountered a subject that, as he acknowledges, 
,has seemingly been understood by literary methods. And in fact, 
Skinner admits that what literature has contributed to this study 
has some use to it. What Skinner has to offer is a new formula-
tion, and any «new" creation automatically assumes that there is 
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an "old" formulation to begin with. It also automatically assumes 
that this "new" formulation is different in some important way 
from the "old" one, and that that difference is indeed useful. All 
this sets up an opposition which must of course be argued. And 
arguing is exactly what Skinner is doing throughout Verbal 
Behavior. This results in an almost undercutting of Skinner's 
assumptions about science versus literature. Throughout this 
argument, Skinner makes the literary approach seem somewhat 
primitive and underdeveloped in comparison to science. Hence 
the term "prescientific" with which he labels it. Indeed, in assert-
ing that literature is the simple depiction or portrayal of behav-
ior, Skinner is echoing an argument that began with Aristotle 
and his Poetics. Skinners description of the relationship between 
literature and human behavior {or action to use Aristotle's ter-
minology} is a mimetic relationship. Literature is simply the 
description and portrayal of behavior, which for Skinner gives no 
understanding of that behavior. Skinner champions science on 
the other hand as a "true" understanding of huma~ behavior, in 
that it sets out to understand the processes and conditions that 
lead to behavior. Skinner describes the knowledge that the sci-
entific approach can impart about human behavior as a superior 
successor to the literary approach. But, again, this is something 
that must be argued. The superiority of the scientific approach 
over the literary one is not a given, but is instead an assertion 
that Skinner makes and must then argue for. The merits of sci-
ence are not inherent, but must be demonstrated by Skinner 
himsel£ It is clear that while describing his theory about human 
verbal behavior, Skinner likewise engages in this argument for 
the bulk of his work. 
In effect what Skinner has done is adopt a new and untested 
structur~ for the study of human behavior, and. verbal behavior 
as a particular subset of that. This structure is of course what 
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Skinner would call "scientific." This makes it necessary to look 
at the structure he has adopted and how it describes behavior. 
The rubric under which Skinner has placed his ideas is that of 
"science." And it is this rubric within which' he wants to place 
the study of human behavior, including verbal behavior. In order 
to accomplish this, Skinner must demonstrate that verbal behav-
ior is indeed capable of scientific treatment. In essence, this 
means, as Skinner stated himself, that verbal behavior must be 
shown to be orderly, predictable, and controllable. And it is in 
this effort that Skinner reveals what exacdy he means by the term 
"science," and what he envisions for the study of human behav-
ior and psychology in general. 
Two processes, or paradigms as Skinner calls them, will serve 
to demonstrate Skinner's notion of "science." These processes are 
those of what Skinner calls the "mand" and the "tact," and will 
be discussed in detail further on. The first of these is that of the 
mand, and Skinner graphically depicts this process as shown 
below (V7J, 38): 
SPEAKER 
(Au~i .. n) ·.r'I~. PIIIII" krll~ -nut YII" "y •• 'r. W.ln .... 
S· • H' ~ snllY + S· • H' ~ sullY 
t---~~----t----~~------tt 
s·, • R --» Srll.Y + S· • H' 
".rlld. PI.III" ,ISS.S krlB~ "Thlt Y.u" "YII'r. W.II: ••• • 
AUDIENCE 
Skinner describes this process as a stimulus-response process, 
which for Skinner is the basis of human verbal behavior and 
interaction. In this specific example, the speaker's hunger and 
the presence of a receptive audience (Sd) lead the speaker to 
request or "mand" the bread, which serves as a stimulus for 
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the audience to pass the bread (R), thus reinforcing the 
speaker's request. This leads the speaker to say "Thank you," 
(Rv) a stimulus (sreinV + Sd) for the audience to again reinforce 
(Rv) the speaker with "You're welcome." Clearly this process 
sa~isifes the scientific goal of orderliness, prediction, and con-
trol that Skinner desires for the study of behavior. But this 
same process or pattern also exists outside of the stimulus-
response process, and in the physical sciences. The most obvi-
ous example to draw from is chemistry, specifically the chem-
ical reaction process. To be somewhat simplistic, in the chem-
ical reaction, elements and/or compounds are combined 
under certain controlled conditions. Assuming that these 
conditions exist, the result of this combination can then be 
predicted. To take a rather simple example, the combination 
of two hydrogen molecules with one oxygen molecule will 
result in the creation of water. The same pattern can also be 
found in Skinner's paradigms of verbal behavior. To again use 
this specific example of the mand, the "elements" would be 
the speaker and the audience, and the conditions would be 
that the speaker is hungry, the bread is available, and the 
audience is receptive to the speaker's request or mand. These 
conditions thus lead the speaker to request the bread, and the 
audience to pass the bread to the speaker. Once the audience 
has passed the bread, ~he speaker now thanks the audience for 
doing so, and the audience consequently acknowledges that 
thanks with "You're welcome." This process is clearly an 
ordered one in that certain actions follow other actions. It is 
also predictable, as one can predict what will happen from 
one action to the next. Finally, it too can be controlled, as 
knowledge of the "elements" or conditions that determine 
and shape this interaction will allow one to control and 
manipulate this sequence of behaviors. 
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As mentioned earlier, the same basic-chemical-process 
appears,in depicting the process of what Skinner describes as the 
"tact." Again, Skinner uses a paradigm that he has created to 
visually depict this process (VB, 84): 
SPEAKE R 
..... II. djut (A .. illu) -..... -8i,.tI" 
S' + S' • R' ~ Sill. 
Red t ,J,,J, tt Ohjact 
S' + S' • R' 
........ djut ...... "li,UI- ..... ? 
LISTENER 
In this instance, the elements are the speaker, the audience and 
the red object. When the red object and the audience are com-
bined in a context or condition that facilitates the naming of the 
object's color, the result is the speaker's emission of the statement 
"Red." This statement in turn results in the audience's response 
of "Right!" which, while Skinner identifies it as reinforcement, is 
also a result of this second "verbal reaction." Again, this process 
is orderly, predictable, and controllable in the same basic way as 
the mand and the chemical reaction. 
Clearly the process of language is more complex than the 
simple example of the chemical reaction that leads to water. But 
the same pattern exists in both instances. In describing the pat-
tern or paradigm of the mand and the tact, Skinner uses the 
stimulus-response pattern as the foundation of this interaction 
between speaker and audience, and indeed, this pattern guides 
his entire theory concerning verbal behavior. But this complex 
process of stimulus-response is similar to that of the chemical 
reaction, as in both cases, the combination of certain "elements" 
under specific and determined conditions leads to a predictable, 
and ultimately controllable result. One will of course remember 
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that this is one of the goals that Skinner set before himself in his 
conception of human verbal behavior, in that it must be con-
ceptualized in such a way that it could be predicted and con-
trolled. This is exactly what Skinner has done. He has created a 
paradigm for the process of verbal behavior that facilitates, if not 
demands, the achieveIpent of his goal. 
This is not the only case of Skinner's "fetching" science as a 
way of understanding and structuring the process of verbal 
behavior. What this particular paradigm does is make language 
and the process of verbal behavior both quantifiable and formu-
laic. In essence, one need only know certain variables in the sit-
uation in order to create a certain result. And Skinner goes on to 
apply aspects of the physical sciences in further descriptions of 
verbal behavior. For example, he goes on to describe some of 
what he calls the "dynamic properties" of the mand after describ-
ing its basic process: 
The energy level of the mand may vary from very faint to very loud, 
and the speed with which it is emitted when the occasion arises may 
vary from very fast to very slow. If the pattern is of substantial 
length, it may be executed slowly or rapidly. If the reinforcement is 
not immediately forthcoming, the response may be emitted only 
once or may be repeated. These properties vary as the result of many 
conditions in the past and present history of the speaker. Particularly 
relevant are level of deprivation and intensity of aversive stimulation 
and the extent to which a given listener or someone like him has 
reinforced similar responses in the past (or has refused to do so). 
Such conditions have a relatively greater effect upon the mand than 
upon the other types of verbal behavior to be discussed in later chap-
ters. The wide range of dynamic properties which result makes 
the mad a very expressive type of operant. 
The probability and intensity of the listener's behavior may also 
vary over a wide range. If the listener is not already predisposed to 
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act, the probability of his mediating a reinforcement may depend 
upon the effectiveness of the aversive stimulation supplied by the 
speaker. Some listeners are accustomed to taking orders-they 
have felt the unconditioned aversive consequences of not doing 
so-and respond appropriately to simple mands. Others are more 
likely to react to softened forms. The intonation, loudness, or 
other indications that the speaker will supply aversive conse-
quences has an appropriate effect. A hesitant or weak request or 
command is least likely to be reinforced. A loud and threatening 
response is likely to be reinforced subject only to the relative 
strength of listener and sp'eaker. It is to be noted that mands are 
characteristic of most hypnotic ipstructions, and the extent to 
which the subject co-operates or obliges the hypnotist will depend 
upon the kinds of variables here being considered. These variables 
enter into what is called the authority or prestige of the speaker. 
(VB,42-43) 
Throughout this passage, Skinner makes reference to the mand 
and the process it involves as possessing such properties as ener-
gy, speed, intensity, probability, strength, and frequency, all of 
which are scientific (and again, this refers to the physical sci-
ences) terms and concepts. Skinner goes on to show how one can 
make predictions of what will occur in a verbal interaction based 
on the quantity or intensity of these dynamic properties. This 
again facilitates Skinner's goal of making the study of verbal 
behavior a part of scientific study. 
But it is important to note just how Skinner is applying these 
principles of the physical sciences to verbal behavior, and what 
this application does to the relationship between science and ver-
bal behavior. As' Skinner himself described it, this scientific 
methodology is an entirely new way of structuring the process of 
verbal behavior. And Skinner's justification for adopting this 
structure is his belief that through it, we can learn the "true" 
nature of verbal behavior, allowing us to understand, predict, 
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and ultimately control that process. The important thing to note 
here is this idea of having to work through this structure. Earlier, 
Skinner described how the literary approach attempted to con-
ceptualize and understand the process of verbal behavior. Again, 
this was another structure through which people who studied 
language had to work in order to get to language. But in stating 
this, Skinner is immediately creating structures even before he 
turns to' studying language. In attempting to bring the study of 
verbal behavior under the rubric of science, Skinner automati-
cally assumes a structure in which there is such a thing as science. 
Consequently, this move also results in the conceptualization of 
things that could be seen as "not science." And it is this latter cat-
egory under which Skinner places the current literary under-
standing of verbal behavior. In essence, science is another struc-
ture through which one must work through. In that, it is no dif-
ferent from a literary structure or approach. Both color and 
determine the perception and discussion of what constitues and 
what is important to the study of verbal behavior. 
The specific problem Skinner has with this literary approach, 
and the reason why he saw the scientific approach as more valu-
able and useful, was its blatant use of metaphor. The process of 
metaphor is of course the likening of two disparate things to 
another in such a way that one serves to describe, or structure, 
the other. John Donne's poem "A Valediction Forbidding 
Mourning" serves as a good example of this. In that poem, 
Donne likens a pair of separated lovers to a geometer's compass, 
in which one foot remains in place while the other moves 
around, though this second foot always comes back to where it 
started. This metaphor, this conceptualization, this structure, 
gives us a particular way of thinking about the separation of 
these two lovers. To return to the study of language, the literary 
approach gives us one particular way of conceptualizing and 
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structuring and thinking about the process of verbal behavior. 
This conceptualization is one based on metaphorical relation-
ships which, according to Skinner, is an insufficient way to pro-
duce understanding. 
But Skinner's adoption of science as a structure or conceptu-
alization of verbal behavior is inherently metaphorical in nature. 
Where literature was a method that used metaphor to under-
stand verbal behavior, Skinner's adoption and extension of the 
scientific approach to language is a metaphorical extension. 
These scientific principles that Skinner is applying to verbal 
behavior are simply a new way of structuring and understanding 
that process. One will recall that Skinner earlier described how 
literature in its use of metaphor came to "fetch" or extend these 
metaphors to the point where they were no longer of use. 
Science he said was different because it limited its use of 
metaphor to only a modest amount, and also ((knew" when to 
stop fetching or extending those metaphors. But, as was demon-
strated above in the description of Skinner's mand and tact par-
adigms, what Skinner is in effect doing when he says he is using 
a scientific approach to understanding verbal behavior is indeed 
extending the concepts of the physical sciences such as chemistry 
or physics, to the process of verbal behavior, a domain which is 
not currently within the strictures of science. His extension of 
the chemical reaction process as the basis of the process of verbal 
behavior is only a single example of how Skinner does this. But 
it serves to show the intrinsically metaphorical nature of what 
Skinner is attempting to do. Skinner's entire use of science as an 
approach to studying verbal behavior is based on much more 
than a modest metaphorical extension. 
In effect, what Skinner is approaching is not so much a new 
formulation or methodology for the study of literature, though 
this may be a consequence of his actions. Instead what Skinner 
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proposes is in essence an exchange of metaphors for conceptual-
izing the process and nature of verbal behavior. The literary and 
scientific approaches that Skinner draws distinctions between are 
actually two opposing metaphorical structures that attempt to 
describe these processes. Skinner is simply choosing to adopt the 
scientific way of viewing language, and it is this metaphor which 
he is constantly working through. One could liken it to a kind 
of filter between Skinner and language, as his adoption of a cer-
tain metaphor or structure colors and shapes how he will 
approach and come to understand this construct. One could 
even go so far as to describe Skinner's use of metaphor and struc-
ture as operating on two levels~ Skinner operates on one level in 
his adoption of science as his metaphor for understanding 
human verbal behavior. This autom~tically is the creation of a 
structure that includes science and "not science" with those 
approaches or metaphors that fall under the rubric of science 
being more highly valued then those belonging to "not science." 
But this structure is again ~etaphorical in being only one way to 
structure the world. ~ne could just as easily create a structure of 
literary and "not literary" in which the literary metaphor is val-
ued more highly. And it is of course this second structure or 
metaphor which Skinner is working against and hopes to sup-
plant with his own. 
Skinner also operates metaphorically at another level as, 
upon his adoption of the scientific paradigm or metaphor, he 
then applies those things which have been id~ntified as science 
to a subject matter. that is "not science." This is of course demon-
strated in his application of the physical sciences and such things 
as the chemical reaction and various scientific properties to 
describe the mand and tact processes. This chemical reaction is 
a metaphorical restructuring of verbal behavior by Skinner. In 
this application, Skinner is operating at the level of actual lan-
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guage in his extension, or fetching, of the scientific metaphor 
that he has adopted to specific prQcesses of language. 
Skinner then is adopting science as an approach to under-
standing language and verbal behavior. In d~ing so, Skinner cre-
ates a structure in which a scientific approach to this study is 
more highly valued than other approaches. But' Skinner's cre-
ation of structures does not end with this structure of approach-
es nor with his metaphorical application of the physical sciences 
to specific verbal processes and interactions. In his study of lan-
guage and verbal behavior, Skip.ner creates his own structures of 
verbal behavior. that he casts within the scientific vein. Of course, 
the creation of structures to shape one's understanding of a sub-
ject is not new with ~kin~er, and this process is one that has been 
often examined. One of those figures that dealt with the issue of 
creating structures was Fried.rich Nietzsche in his work ((Truth 
and Falsity in an Ultramoral Sense." In that text, Nietzsche 
describes the process by which structures such as Skinner's even-
tually came to be developed: 
EvelY idea originates through equating the u.p.equal. As certainly as 
no one leafis exactly similar to any o.ther, so certain is it that the idea 
"leaf' has been formed through an arbitrary omission of those indi-
vidual differences, through a forgetting of the differentiating quali-
ties, and this idea now awakens the notion that in nature there is, 
besides the leaves, a something called the "leaf," perhaps a primal 
form according to which all leaves were woven, drawn, accurately 
measured, colored, crinkled, painted, but by unskilled hands, so that 
no copy had turned out correct and trustworthy as a true copy of the 
primal form. (1992, 636) 
This first passage from Nietzsch~ points out a fundamental dif-
ficulty in creating structures. In structures, things or objects are 
grouped together under some concept or term, such as "leaf" in 
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Nietzsche's example, that ignores the fact that each and every 
object within that gr9uP is different. Without those differences, 
there would be no need to categorize them as they would all be 
the same object. The result of this according to Nietzsche is that 
we come to adopt this structure or categorization, which 
Nietzsche sees as arbitrary, and eventually come to believe that 
this idea or concept that we hold is indeed true. As Nietzsche 
himself then asks, 
What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, 
anthropomorphisms: in shon a sum of human rdations which 
become poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, 
adorned, and after long usage seems to a nation fixed, canonic, and 
binding; truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are 
illusions. (1992,636) 
Important in these passages from Nietzsche are the ideas of 
"nature," "arbitrary," "illusions" and "forgetting." For Nietzsche, 
the arbitrary essence of concepts and structures stems from the 
fact that they are human creations, and not some natural occur-
rence. Structures are not created in or by nature, but are instead 
human ideas of how the world works. These ideas are then 
imposed on nature of the world by man. All structures then are 
created by a human equating of things that are essentially differ-
ent. According to Nietzsche, these concepts and structures 
become so ingrained in human beings through their usage that 
the structure is what comes to be seen as nature, when it is in fact 
an ,artificial and human construct. This is where the idea of for-
getting comes in, as Nietzsche sees man creating these artificial 
structures, and then forgetting the fact that they were indeed cre-
ated, and subsequently treating them as though they were "true." 
With this critique of structures in mind, we can turn to 
examining the structures of language that Skinner creates in 
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Verbal Behavior. The first structure of Skinner's to be examined 
will be his actual conception of how languag~ and'verhal behav-
ior function. This is of course the structure alluded to previous-
ly, being composed of what Skinner calls the "mand~" the (~tact," 
and the "autoclitic." Skinner also creates a structure to the use of 
language and :verbal behavior-that also bears examining, and this 
will be looked at through Skinner's creation .of "verbal commu-
.. " nltles. 
The first part of the three-part structure that Skinner deals 
with i~ the mand. As Skinner defines it, this is "the type ofver-
bal operant in wllich< a respo~s~ of given form is characteristical-
ly foll?wed by ~ gi~en consequence in a'verbal com~unity" (VB, 
35). Skinner goes on to give specific ~~ples ~fwhat responses 
and what consequences he is describing: 
In a given verbal community, cert~n respoJ;l$.es are characteristically 
followed by certain co11$equences .. Wtfit! is followed by someone's 
waiting and Sh-hlby silence. MuclJ. ?f t~e v~rbal behavior 'of young 
. children is of this sort. Candy! is characteristically followed by the 
receipt of Candy and Out! by the' opening of a door. These effects are 
bot inevitable, but we can usually find one consequence of each 
response which is commoner than any other. (VB. 35) 
One. can clearly s~e the kind .of rel~tioQship .Skinner is identi-
fYing here. And he goes .on to .say that this '~basic relationship 
has· been reGognized. in syptactic and .gra~mati~ analyses 
(expressions such ,as the "imperative mood" and "commands. 
and entreaties" suggest ~etnselves) but no, traditional tet:m can 
safely be used here" (VB, 35). This again d~P1onstrates.how 
Ski~ner rejects previous conc.eptions o(y~rbal behavior, .as here 
he objects. to terms derived from. grammatical, or rhetorical 
studies of language. It is here. that Ski~ner ,c(-eates the "mand." 
He "also gives v.ery p:;u-ticular req,sons for. cr,eating this term, as 
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he states that ((the term 'mand' has certain mnemonic value 
derived from 'command,' 'demand,' 'countermand,' and so on, 
and is conveniently brief" (TIB, 35). This idea of convenience 
seems to serve as the basis for Skinner's structure, and also 
serves to harken back some of the criticisms Nietzsche made of 
structures in general that exist within Skinner's structure. To 
begin with, the term "mand" serves much the same purpose as 
Nietzsche described the term "leaf" as serving. Both terms are 
in essence a grouping together of similar things under one 
rubric or category. But just as Nietzsche stated that this group-
ing ignores the fact that all leaves are different, Skinner's cre-
ation of the mand ignores the differences that exist within that 
category. And Skinner himself even points out these differ-
ences. As seen in the second quotation from Skinner, the rela-
tionship that defines the mand is not an absolute one. The con-
sequences that result ~rom the use of a mand are not always the 
same, and indeed Skinner states that one can. identify a com-
mon consequence. This inherently implies that there exist 
uncommon consequences, or differences in the consequences 
of the various verbal operants that Skinner groups under the 
term mand. To go back to Nietzsche's example, just as the term 
"leaf" was used to describe all kinds of different and distinct 
leaves, Skinner uses the term "mand" to describe a body of ver-
bal operants that are not necessarily consistently alike in their 
consequences, nor does the same mand have consistently the 
same result. 
The second part of this structure that Skinner creates is that 
of the "tact." And again, Skinner gives a specific example of the 
relationship he is attempting to describe: 
The three-term contingency in this type of operant is exemplified 
when, in the presence of a doll, a child frequently achieves some sort 
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of generalized reinforcement by saying doll:, or when a teleost fish, or 
picture th~eof, is the occasion upon which the student of zoology is 
reinforced when he says teleost fish. (VB, 81) 
In other words, the tact is a response made in the presence of 
some object or event, such as the doll in this example. The 
process br which Skinner creates a name for this type of ve~bal 
operant parallels that by which he created the mand. For exam-
ple, as iiI the case of the mand, Skinner rejects other previous 
attempts to describe this relationship: 
There is no suitable term for this type of operant. "Sign," "symbol," 
and more technical terms from logic and semantics commit us to 
special schemes of reference and stress the verbal response itself 
rather than the controlling relationship. (VB, 81) 
From here, Skinner creates his new grouping term and describes 
the particular relationship that drives it: 
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The invented term "tact" will be used here. The term carries a 
mnemonic suggestion of behavior which "makes contact with" the 
physical world. A tact may be defined as a verbal operant in which a 
response of given form is evoked (or at least strengthened) by a par-
ticular object or event or property of an object or event. We account 
for the strength by showing that in the presence of the object or 
event a response of that form is characteristically reinforced in a 
given verbal community. 
It may be tempting to say that in a tact the response "refers to," 
"mentions," "announces," "talks about," "names," "denotes," or 
"describes" its stimulus. But the essential relation between 
response and controlling stimulus is precisely the same as in 
echoic, textual, and intraverbal behavior. We are not likely to say 
that the intraverbal stimulus is "referred to" by all the responses it 
evokes, or that an echoic or textual response "mentions" or 
CC describes" its controlling variable. The only useful functional rela-
tion is expressed in the statement that the presence of a given stim-
ulus raises the probability of occurrence of a given form of 
response. This is also the essence of the tact. (VB, 81-82) 
As can be seen from this passage, much of what was said about 
Skinner's mand can also be applied to the tact. Both are cate-
gorical terms in that Skinner attempts to group a set of verbal 
operants within these terms. In the use of both terms, Skinner 
demonst~ates his rejection of previous attempts to structure ver-
bal behavior. Furthermore, both terms are created based on a 
mnemonic sense as well as a need for convenience. In this, one 
can see Skinner's influence from rhetorical practice, as it is 
much easier to describe a groups of such terms by a single name 
then having to repeatedly describe it, for instance, as "a verbal 
operant in which a response of given form is characteristically 
foll9wed by a given consequence" in the case of the mand. This 
rhetorical influence seems to be a strong one in Skinner, as his 
creation of these terms is as much driven by the mnemonic rela-
tionships that he finds as they are by the fact that a single term 
to describe a body of operants will make it much easier to pre-
sent and argue for his structure as well as simply making lan-
guage easier to deal with. 
The creation of the tact also bears the same Nietzschean 
flaws that the creation of the mand did. As with any grouping 
term, the tact ignores the differences inherent in the body of 
operants it attempts to describe. As was the case with the mand, 
Skinner seems to acknowledge these differences, even as his use 
of the term ignores them. In the above passage quoted from 
Skinner, he describes the relationship of the tact as based on 
probability. In effect, with the presentation of a particular object 
or event, the probability that a given response will occur increas-
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es. But again, this response is not a given, just as a particular con-
sequence of a maud was also not definite .. In the use of such 
terms as "characteristically reinforced" and "increased probabili-
ty," Skinner is again demonstrating that the relationship that he 
is describing in the tact is not an absolute. The use of these terms 
to describe this relationship automatically implies that some-
times this relationship does not hold true. Again, there are dif-
ferences within the relationship that Skinner identifies as the tact 
that are ignored when he uses this terril. 
The third term that completes Skinner's structure of verbal 
behavior is also his most difficult to grasp. This term is of course 
what he calls the "autoelitic." Skinner defines the autoelitic as 
"intended to suggest behavior which is based upon or depends 
upon other verbal behavior" (VB, 315). In essence, the auto-
elitic seems to work between the mand and the tact and in some 
. ways, qualifies them. Skinner goes on to describe particular 
kinds of autoelities, which results in three subcategories of auto-
elities. The first of these are "descriptive autoelities," which 
Skinner defines as "responses ... associated with other. verbal 
behavior effective upon the same listener at the same time" (v.B, 
315). As examples, Skinner describes various types of descrip-
tive autoelities: 
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One type of descriptive autoclitic informs the listener of the kind of 
verbal operant it accompanies. If the speaker is reading a newspaper 
and remarks I see it is going to rain, the I see informs the listener that 
it is going to rain is emitted as a textual response .... Another group 
of autoclitics describe the state of strength of a response. I guess, I 
estimate, I believe, I imagine, and I surmise all indicate that the 
response which follows is based upon insufficient stiqlUlation or has 
been .poorly conditioned .... Another group of autoclitics describe 
relations between a response and other verbal behavior of the speak-
er or listener, or other circumstances under which behavior is emit-
ted. Important examples are I agree, I confess, I expect, I concede, I 
infer, I predict, I dare say, I must say, I can say, I admit, I reply, I should 
say, and I mean to say. All of these permit the listener to rdate the 
response which follows to other aspects of the current situation, and 
hence to react to it more efficiently. (VB, 315) 
In essence, these descriptive autoclities are certain phrases that 
describe or indicate something about the response they modify. 
The second type of autoclitic that Skinner creates is the "quali-
fying autoclitic," which he describes as serving the "function of 
qualifying a tact in such a way that the intensity or direction of 
the listener's behavior is modified" (VB, 322). The two examples 
he uses here are negation and assertion. The effect of these qual-
ifying autoclities is a change in the listener's behavior. In the case 
of negation, the listener's behavior ceases, whereas assertion 
encourages behavior. The third and final type of autoclitic that 
Skinner describes is that of the quantifying autoclitic, and in this 
Skinner deals with such words as the, a, some, and other words 
that indicate some sort of amount or quantity, and each has a 
different effect on the listener and his subsequent, behavior. 
In the autoclitic, one begins to see how these three terms, 
which originally seem to be simple descriptions of particular 
aspects of verbal behavior, begin to reflect more and more of a 
structure or framework to language and verbal behavior. The 
autoclitic seems to move between and mediate or modify 
Skinner's mands and tacts. In the three subcategories of autocl-
ities, one can see in each one a different modification of the 
mand and tact and their effects both on the speaker's and the 
listener's behavior. 
Clearly, the mand and the tact are the focal points of the 
structure or framework that Skinner is slowly developing in 
Verbal Behavior. While the autoclitic does possess a particular 
function, its very function is defined in terms of these other two 
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categories. As can b~ seen, the mand and the tact are no longer 
simple categories of language, but are instead actual processes of 
langu~ge that people using language actually use. In his original 
conception of these two terms, the mand and the tact' were sim-
ply categories to identify certain types of verbal operants that 
seem to regularly occur in verbal behavior. But as Skinner con-
tinues his analysis of verbal behavior, it becomes clear that the 
mand and tact are no longer simple descriptions. Instead, they 
become what people actually do in language. In several places 
throughout Verbal Behavior, Skinner describes people in a ver-
bal community doing what can only be called "manding" and 
« • " tactlng : 
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The poet is affected here by the reinforcements which are responsi-
ble for the vulgar forms Look, See, and Listen-forms which mainly 
call attention to the speaker (Listen, have you seen George?, Look, can 
you give me some help? or See here, what are you up to?). See is also used 
to mand attention to something being described (There he stood. see, 
and I said to him ... ). The poetic variant of See is Behold. The poet 
mands the listener to see someone sitting upon a grassy green and to 
hark, not only to his words, but to the lark. He also mands him to 
speak up (Tell me, where is fancy bred?), to be quiet (Oh, never say 
that I was false of heart) and to co-operate in various practical affairs 
related to the poet's deprivations: Come, let us kiss, Come live with me 
and be my love, Take, 0 take those lips away, or Drink to me only with 
thine eyes. (VB, 30) 
When a cook tacts a given state of affairs with the simple 
announcement Dinner!, she creates a verbal occasion upon which 
one may successfully sit down to the table. But the listener does 
not sit down to, or eat, the verbal stimulus. The kind of response 
which can be made to both the dinner and the verbal stimulus 
Dinner/is exemplified by the salivary response conditioned accord-
ing to the Pavlovian formula. The practical behavior of the listen-
er (the consequences of which are ultimately responsible for the 
development of the verbal response in the first place) must be for-
mulated as a discriminated operant involving three terms, no two 
of which provide a parallel for the notion of a symbol. (VB, 88) 
As can be seen in these two passages, Skinner is no longer using 
his terms of mand and tact to describe or identify certain pat-
terns of verbal behavior. In fact, the mand and the tact have 
become behaviors themselves. Where before these two concepts 
were created to group a number of particular verbal behaviors, 
these two passages show that Skinner now sees the mand and the 
tact as actual processes of language and verbal behaviors. 
From this point, these two processes become explanations of 
other aspects of human verbal behavior. Skinner deals with these 
other aspects as extensions of both the mand and the tact 
processes. To begin, Skinner identifies two types of extended 
mands. Both of these share the same basic process of the mand. 
But the extension that Skinner is dealing with here is an exten-
sion that makes the mand process in these cases somewhat 
unique. The two extended mands that Skinner deals with are 
what he calls "superstitious mands" and "magical mands.)) 
Skinner defines superstitious mands as "mands which cannot be 
explained by arguing that responses of the same form have been 
reinforced under similar circumstances" (VB, 47). In other 
words, these are mands that occur as a result of other successful 
mands, but this is not due to any C<?nsistent reinforcement or 
success. The specific example that Skinner uses is gambling: 
The dice player exclaims Come sevm!, for example, even though he 
has not asked for and got sevens anywhere. Accidental reinforce-
ment of the response appears to be the explanation .... The player 
may readily admit that there is no mechanical connection between 
his response and the behavior of the dice, but he retains the response 
in some strength and continues to utter it . .. (VB, 47) 
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The second type of extended mand is what Skinner calls the 
"magical mand." He defines these as mands "which cannot be 
accounted for by showing that they have even had the effect 
specified or any similar effect upon similar occasions" (VB, 48). 
Skinner goes on to give examples of what he means: 
The speaker appears to create new mands on the analogy of old ones. 
Having effectively manded bread and butter, he goes on to mand 
the jam, even though he has never obtained jam before in this way. 
The poet exclaims Milton, thou shouldrt be living in this hour!, 
although he has never successfully addressed Milton before nor 
brought anyone to life with a similar response. The special relation 
between response and consequence exemplified by the mand estab-
lishes a general pattern of control over the environment. In 
moments of sufficient stress, the speaker simply describes the rein-
forcement appropriate to a given state of deprivation or aversive 
stimulation. The response must, of course, already be part of his ver-
bal repertoire as some other type of verbal operant. (VB, 48) 
In a way, the magical mand is an extension of the superstitious 
mand, in that, where the superstitious mand was based on 
accidental reinforcement of previous mands, the magical 
mand, while still based on previous mands, has never been 
reinforced. Thus it seems just one step beyond the supersitious 
mand, and further and further from a true mand. In both of 
these extensions, Skinner asserts that the mand process is 
operating in the behavior of the speaker. These extensions for 
Skinner only exist because the mand process has proven suc-
cessful due to previous experience of it being reinforced. One 
can see here how the mand has been metamorphosed beyond 
a simply descriptive category and into an explanatory process. 
The mand itself is now a process of verbal behavior that can 
be extended beyond its normal use and context. Inherent in 
both of these extensions is an assumption and acceptance of 
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the mand as an actual aspect of verbal behavior that actively 
operates in human. interaction. 
A similar type of extension occurs with the tact process. In 
this case, there are five types of extensions that can occur. 
Skinner calls the first type of extension a "generic extension." 
Skinner uses the example of a chair to demonstr~te this process. 
As he describes it, a person demonstrates generic extension when 
he calls a new type of chair that he encounters a "chair." This 
goes back to the idea of a primal form, such as that of the leaf 
which Nietzsche discussed. One has a general idea or conception 
of "leaf" by which one can identify other objects as leaves. The 
same thing happens with the chair. One has a general concep-
tion of "chair" by which one can identify other objects as chairs. 
The second type of extension of the tact process that Skinner 
identifies is a "metaphorical extension": 
'When for the first time a speaker calls someone a mouse, we account 
for the response by noting cenain properties-smallness, timidity, 
silent movement, so on-which are common to the kind of situation 
in which the response is characteristically reinforced and to the par-
ticular situation in which the response is now emitted. Since these 
are not the properties used by zoologists or by the lay community as 
the usual basis for reinforcing a response, we call the extension 
metaphorical ... 'When a metaphorical response is effective and duly 
reinforced, jt ceases to be primarily a metaphor. A man is seldom 
called a mouse in an extended tact. Mous~ has become a standard 
form in the reinforcing community in which small size, timidity, 
and other properties play an acknowledged role. (VB, 93) 
Again, this is similar to the earlier discussion of Herculean effort. 
In both cases, what was a descriptive term at a particular instant 
is extended into a general description of similar events. This -type 
of extension is similar to what Skinner identifies as the .third type 
of tact extension, the "metonymical extension:" 
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Here an extension of a tact occurs when a stimulus acquires control 
over the response because it freqt,lendy, acco!"parzies the stimulus 
upon which reinforc~ent is norm-vly contingent. Thus, w~ say 
The White House denied the rumor, although it was the President 
who spoke, or You haven'/ touched your dinner, when the important 
fact was'that the dinner was not eaten. We account for such behav-
ior by noting that the President and the White' House, and touch-
ing and eating,· frequently occur together. (VB, 99-100) 
The difference between metaphorical and metonymical exten-
sion is that, in metonymical extension, something associated 
with an object or event represents that object or event. In 
metaphorical extension, the representative term is not necessar-
ily associated with what it replaces, such as with the lovers-as-
compass metaphor from Donne. Skinner labels the fourth type 
of extended tact as a «solecistic extension" which Skinner 
describes by saying 
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A still more tenuous extension of the tact is so useless and con-
fusing to the listener that it is described with such pejorative 
terms as malaprop, solecism, or catachresis. The property which 
gains control of the response is only distantly related to the defin-
ing property upon which standard reinforcements are contingent 
or is similar to that property for irrelevant reasons. This is not to 
say that some malaprops are not effective or go unreinforced. We 
may not be seriously disturbed when someone says dilemma 
although a situation is merely difficult, or feasible when action is 
merely possible .... 
As in metaphor and metonymy, solecistic extension is common-
est when no other response is available. Also, as in metaphor and 
metonymy, some erroneous responses are reinforced by the verbal 
community and acquire a functional, if not a social, status com-
parable with that of correct responses. Original mistakes are per-
haps almost as rare as original metaphors. (VB, 102) 
In this example, the speaker is responding to an event or situa-
tion with terms like "dilemma" or "feasible" which are inappro-
priate to the situation. But these inappropriate responses are at 
least not punished, if not reinforced, and thus come to be used 
again. The final type of extended tact that Skinner deals with is 
"nomination" or naming. This is also a process of tact extension 
as one gives a name to a person or object and that name then in 
turn becomes a possible response t? that person or object. In all 
of these mand and tact extensions, one can see how Skinner has 
turned his originally descriptive terms into processes of language 
that actually occur in verbal behavior. These extensions take the 
basic process of the mand and the tact that Skinner created and 
applies them in inappropriate situations or contexts. Thus there 
are not only inconsistencies in the consequences of a mand or 
tact. There are also differences in when these patterns are used. 
In effect, not only has Skinner created a structure of normal ver-
bal behavior and patterns with the mand and the tact, but he 
also creates a structure based on these artificial constructs that 
accounts for times when these processes are extended or misap-
plied by a speaker. All of these extensions operate on an assump-
tion that the mand and tact are regular and consistent aspects or 
patterns of verbal behavior that these extensions then warp or 
manipulate. 
This then brings us back full circle to Nietzsche's original 
concerns about the creation of structures and the apparent 
operation of what Nietzsche warned about, though much ear-
lier, in Skinner's work. As Nietzsche stated, the problem with 
structures is that they are originally created and artificial, but 
through their subsequent use, the created and artificial aspect 
of them is forgotten and these structures then come to be seen 
as how nature-or whatever construct is being studied-actually 
works and functions. One could say that Skinner seems to fall 
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prey to this. He begins by imposing a basically descriptive 
structure on language and verbal behavior, as his terms mand, 
tact, and autoclitic are all descriptive of certain aspects of ver-
bal behavior. But then Skinner goes on to portray these terms 
as being actual processes in language and actively Hsed in 
human verbal interaction. No longer is Skinner content to sim-
ply identify some aspect of verbal behavior as "a mand" or "a 
tact." Instead he wants to take what he sees as fundamental 
aspects of verbal behavior and turn them into verbal behavior 
itself. From here, Skinner begins to describe people as "mand-
ing" and "tacting," as if these were things that people actively 
and consciously do. Further, he uses these created processes as 
explanations of verbal behavior that seems to follow these pat-
terns, but in some way extends them inappropriately or to 
inappropriate contexts. In doing all this, Skinner forgets that 
this structure he has created was imposed by him onto lan-
guage. The structure of mand-tact-autoclitic was not some-
thing that simply arose out of language as a natural process of 
verbal behavior. Its very essence is that of a created framework 
that Skinner made in his scientific approach to studying verbal 
behavior. But in using this framework to guide his study of ver-
bal behavior, Skinner more and more depicts language as 
occurring in these patterns he has identified, and ignores the 
fact that he created and imposed these patterns onto language 
and verbal behavior. 
The issue of Skinner's created structures does not end with 
this three-part structure of verbal behavior. For the most part, 
this discussion has focused on Skinner's ideas about responses 
made by a speaker, and little mention has been made of a listen-
er or audience for the speaker, beyond the fact that one exists to 
reinforce or punish certain behavior. When we turn to the idea 
of an audience, we encounter another of Skinner's creations, that 
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of what he calls the "verbal community." Th~oughout the quot-
ed passages from Skinnees Verilal Behavior, ther~ ,has Qeen "refer-
ence to how particular aspects of verhal behavior are reinforced 
or punished by a verbal community, without any real mention 
of what constitutes a verbal community. Skinner does give us his 
an idea of what a verbal community is: 
Audiences which control the largest subdivisions of a verbal reper-
toire are the communities which establish the reinforcing contin-
gencies of the so-called "languages": English, French, Chinese, and 
so on. In a Chinese verbal community, only certain forms of 
response are effective; as an audience, any member or group of 
members of this community constitutes the occasion for the emis-
sion offorms called "Chinese." (VB, 173) 
But Skinner does not limit this concept of verbal community 
simply to different languages. Instead, he goes on to describe 
what could be seen as more specialized verbal communities: 
Within a single language community many jargons, patois, cants, 
and technical vocabularies are controlled by special audiences. 
When these deal with special subject matters, they need not repre-
sent control by an audience. Thus, many objects encountered on a 
sailing boat are usually not encountered elsewhere. The jargon of 
sailing is in this case a subdivision of a repertoire isolated only 
because the occasion upon which it is appropriate is isolated. But 
when an engineer talks about the low tensile strength of a worn 
shoelace, he is speaking a language appropriate to a special audience 
rather than a special state of affairs. In some languages (for example, 
Japanese), certain forms of response are differentially reinforced by 
listeners belonging to different social classes or by listeners standing 
in different relations to the speaker. Each class or relationship thus 
defines a special audience controlling such forms. The "little lan-
guage" with which we talk to children or they to us is a repertoire 
under the control of a special audience. Such a repertoire is rein-
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forced in early childhood by indulgent listeners, but it may survive 
between friends into adulthood .... There are special subdivisions of 
the community which also differentially reinforce bookish, pedantic, 
literary, archaic, polysyllabic, and polite vocabularies, and hence 
compose audiences in the presence of which these forms are partic-
ularly strong. (VB, 173-174) 
In this passage, Skinner seems to be drawing a distinction 
between the verbal community and an audience. The verbal 
community for Skinner appears to be a group of speakers that 
can be identified with a particular kind or type of verbal behav-
ior or speech. An audience then is made up of particular persons 
who belong to that verbal community. And, as mentioned 
before, these communities are not simply based on what lan-
guage is being spoken. As Skinner himself mentioned, these 
communities are made up of people speaking a particular type of 
speech, such as a technical vocabulary. And throughout his text, 
Skinner makes reference to these specialized verbal communities, 
as he describes such things as a scientific verbal' community or a 
literary verbal community, both of which reinforce different uses 
of language and different verbal behavior. 
One will of course remember the distinctions Skinner drew 
between the scientific and literary verbal communities. As 
Skinner described it, the literary verbal community often rein-
forced metaphorical and metonymical usage of language. This 
was opposed to the scientific verbal community which brooked 
little or no metaphorical use of language, and to the extent that 
it did do so, it would eliminate the metaphoric and metonymic 
properties of that response. The difficulty with this sharp a dis-
tinction comes when one looks at how Skinner uses the idea of 
verbal community in his text. As Skinner described it, the verbal 
community is a kind of overarching structure associated with 
certain kinds of verbal behavior, and audiences for verbal behav-
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lor are drawn from these verbal communities. When he is 
describing these audiences in the context of his discussion of ver-
bal communities, Skinner mentions that it is the audience that 
actually reinforces a particular speaker's verbal behavior. But 
throughout Verbal Behavior, Skinner describes the verbal com-
munity itself as reinforcing a speaker's particular verbal behavior. 
In essence, what Skinner has done is substitute the verbal com-
munity for the specific audience that is before the speaker, and 
the process through which he accomplishes this is essentially a 
metonymy. In describing the metonymical extension of the tact, 
Skinner argued that a concept or idea normally associated with 
some other concept or idea comes to symbolize and stand for 
that second idea. One of the examples he used was how we often 
say something similar to ((The White House said today," when 
in fact it was the President, and not the White House, that 
spoke. This is of course the process of metonymy, where one 
thing normally associated with or accompanying another comes 
to replace ~d stand for that second person, object, or so on. In 
saying that the verbal community reinforces a particular aspect 
of verbal behavior, Skinner is actively participating in a 
metonymy. For it is not the verbal community that reinforces 
the verbal behavior, but the specific members of the audience 
who belong to that verbal community. These specific audience 
members are associated with a particular verbal community, and 
through the process of metonymy, Skinner replaces these audi-
ence members with the verbal community itself as reinforcing 
verbal behavior. 
In a way, Skinner bases much of his three-part structure on a 
metonymical relationship as well. In his mand and tact, it is the 
consequences that are normally associated with these types of 
responses that allow Skinner to label them as a mand or a tact. 
As such, these two terms then come to stand for the actual 
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responses that are made when Skinner uses them to describe ver-
bal behavior. One will of course remember Skinner's original 
objections to the use of metaphor or metonymy in literary study 
of human verbal behavior. But it is also this metonymical process 
that allows Skinner to create his structures of verbal behavior. 
To go back to the ideas behind the rhetoric of inquiry, 
Skinner demonstrates much of what this direction of inquiry 
describes in his «scientific" and «objective" study of verbal behav-
ior. Skinner's Verbal Behavior, while an analysis of verbal behav-
ior and its processes, is also a continuing argument for the use of 
scientific methods to investigate language and verbal behavior 
over the literary approach which Skinner hopes to supplant. This 
argument runs the entire length of Skinner's text, making Verbal 
Behavior as much a persuasive and argumentative text as it is an 
analysis of language. In his adoption of science as an approach to 
the study of verbal behavior, Skinner uses the physical sciences 
such as chemistry and physics as a metaphor for what he thinks 
of when he calls something «science." Skinner then applies this 
metaphor of the physical sciences to depict the very processes of 
verbal behavior that he is investigating. Thus the mand and tact 
processes become chemical reactions in the same way that they 
are verbal interactions. This structure that Skinner creates is, as 
Nietzsche pointed out long before, an arbitrary one in that lan-
guage and verbal behavior do not necessarily behave in the way 
Skinner asserts that they do. But Skinner, in the application and 
use of his structure, eventually forgets its created aspect, and 
deals with the processes he has created as actual behaviors or pat-
terns occurring in language. Finally, Skinner's structure of the 
verbal community, and even his mand-tact-autoclitic structure 
of language, is based on an essentially metonymical relationship. 
Skinner describes the verbal community as reinforcing the ver-
bal behavior of a person, when indeed it is the specific members 
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of an audience associated with that verbal community that will 
reinforce or punish certain types of verbal behavior. The verbal 
community may come to accept such behavior in general, but 
this acceptance is through the reinforcement or punishment 
given by a specific audience drawn from that verbal community, 
not the community itselE His three-part structure is also based 
on a somewhat metonymical relationship, as these processes, 
especially the mand and th~ tact, are defined by the conse-
quences or patterns of behaviors that normally accompany the 
verbal behavior in question. And this metonymical aspect is 
what allows Skinner to create the mand and the tact and use 
them in his structure of verbal behavior. 
Clearly there is as much to say about what Skinner says as 
there is about how he says it. While he rejects the methods used 
by the literary, rhetorical, and other approaches to studying ver-
bal behavior, he also demonstrates what could .only be called lit-
erary or rhetorical methods in his own "scientific" and "objec-
tive" study of language and verbal behavior. This is not to say 
that Skinner is wrong because he uses argument, metaphor, 
metonymy, etc. The use Qf rhetorical and persuasive techniques 
does not invalidate what Skinner has to say about language and 
verbal behavior. But it is useful to point out his use of these lit-
erary and rhetorical methods, as his attempt in Verbal Behavior 
to make the study of behavior a science is described by Skinner 
as an effort to eliminate these methods. But clearly Skinner has 
not completely eliminated argument, rhetoric, and metaphor 
from his study. As this discussion of Skinnees work has demon-
strated, these rhetorical and persuasive ways are tied into his "sci-
entific" investigation of language and verbal behavior, and in 
many ways, it is these very methods that allow Skinner to create 
and describe his conception of verbal behavior, even as he claims 
to be eliminating and avoiding the use of these techniques. 
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